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Abstract
We present methods for ranking players in whist tournaments and consider desirable properties of these methods. This
work is analogous to the study of rankings for players in round-robin tournaments.
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1. Introduction
The problem of determining a rank ordering among several competing alternatives has been an important area of research
over the past several decades and has been addressed by numerous authors. This problem arises in a number of settings
in management science, sociometrics, operations research, and computer science. Applications include ranking consumer
preferences for a set of products and group decision-making. A useful way to approach this problem is to require that
each pair of alternatives be compared and that there is a “winner” for each comparison. The problem then is to rank
order all the alternatives, from best to worst. This is exactly the problem of ranking the players who have competed in
a round-robin tournament. As is well known in sports events, group decisions, or product preferences, one competitor
may win over many others but be upset by another competitor who loses most comparisons. It is this fact that makes the
ranking problem di;cult.
Various methods have been proposed for dealing with the ranking problem for round-robin tournaments [16,18]. Zermelo
[21] developed a method based on the maximum likelihood principle. This method was later rediscovered by Bradley
and Terry [5]. Wei [20] and Kendall [12] developed a method that takes into account the strength of competing players.
Others seek rankings with the minimum number of violations [11]. Recently, there have been e@orts to solve the ranking
problem when the paired-comparison data is incomplete or when multiple attributes are being compared (1980s and 1990s,
[6–9]).
In this paper we require that each comparison involves two competitors (a team) against another team of two other
competitors. It is required that each player competes exactly once with every other player as a partner and exactly
twice against every other player as an opponent. This situation describes a structure known as a whist tournament. Whist
tournaments have a rich history in combinatorial design theory (see [1]), where “the whist problem” has meant the problem
of constructing tournament schedules. We consider here the implicit second problem; that of ranking individual players
(not teams, which are only temporary), based on the outcome of the whist tournament. New di;culties arise in the whist
tournament situation because at some point the strongest and the weakest player must be partners; either the strongest
player is beaten by (i.e. plays on a team that is beaten by) two weaker players or the weakest player beats two stronger
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players. The principal problem to be overcome is that of Gnding a way to rank players based not just on the strength of
defeated opponents, but also to take into account the strength of the player’s partner.
Round-robin tournaments and whist tournaments fall within the broader category of generalized tournament designs [2].
In these tournaments, a Gxed number of teams (two or more) of varying membership compete in each game. Each team
contains a Gxed number of players (one or more). Games are played in rounds. A round contains as many games as
possible with remaining players sitting out. For each pair of players, the ratio of the number of times they are on the
same team to the times they are on competing teams must be the same as the ratio in one game of a given player’s
teammates to competitors. Although our ranking methods could be applied to these generalized tournament designs, we
shall restrict our attention to whist tournaments.
In Section 2, we discuss tournament outcomes and consider several natural outcomes that are easy to compute and
likely to occur as outcomes in actual tournaments. These outcomes include: best-wins, worst-loses, and high-sum-wins.
We give examples and show relationships among these outcomes. These special outcomes are used later for computing
player rankings.
In Section 3, we introduce several methods for ranking players in a whist tournament. These are simple in the sense
that they can be computed in a single step. We also consider desirable properties for a ranking method. These properties
include: consistency with the score vector, stability, independence, and minimum upsets. It must be understood that no
single method is likely to be the best for all purposes. As with the problem of ranking players in round-robin tournaments,
these methods will lead to di@erent results (that is, to di@erent orderings and to di@erent measures of relative strength)
for the same outcome.
In Section 4, we consider iterative ranking methods and show convergence of the iterated strength vectors for these
methods.
2. Tournament outcomes
We begin with the deGnition of a whist tournament.
Denition 2.1. A whist tournament Wh(n) for n players is a schedule of games, each pairing two players against two
others such that
1. games are played in rounds,
2. every pair of players partner once and oppose twice,
3. in each round either
(a) each player plays in one game (n= 4k), or
(b) one player sits out and all other players play in one game each (n= 4k + 1).
The round structure of a whist tournament is not needed for our ranking methods, which require only that condition
2, the balance condition, be satisGed. Although the whist tournament literature is extensive, tournaments lacking a round
structure have been little studied. We consider only whist tournaments.
A Wh(4k) and a Wh(4k+1) exist for all k¿ 1 (see [1]). When p=4k+1 is a prime, a Wh(p) can be constructed using
a primitive root of p. The resulting whist tournament is Z-cyclic, meaning that an initial round (round 0) determines the
tournament. Each subsequent round is found by adding 1 (mod p) to the previous round. To aid in visualization, imagine
that the games are played at k tables indexed from 0 to k − 1. Teams face o@ across the table, one team on the left, and
one team on the right. In the literature, the notation (a; b; c; d) denotes the game in which players a and c compete as a
team against players b and d. In this paper we use the notation a; c v b; d.
Construction 2.2 (Z-cyclic Wh(p), p prime). If p=4k +1 is prime and ! a primitive root of p, then the table i, round
0 game is
!i;−!i v !k+i ;−!k+i (mod 4k + 1):
The table i, round j game is determined by adding j(mod p) to each player in the table i, round 0 game.
Denition 2.3. For a given whist tournament, and one of its games, the game outcome is a speciGcation of a winning
team and losing team for the game. A tournament outcome is a speciGcation of a game outcome to each game.
We refer to a tournament outcome simply as an outcome. Note that the existence of an outcome implies that all games
have outcomes and no ties occur. Once an outcome has been speciGed, a ranking method is used to rank the players.
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Denition 2.4. A ranking  of players is a function that assigns to each player a real number. A ranking method M is
a function that assigns to each whist tournament and outcome a ranking of players, M. For convenience, we write  for
the ranking if the method is Gxed.
For rankings of players, we assume that larger numbers represent stronger players and smaller numbers represent weaker
players. The most basic ranking method is the score vector. The score vector measures for each player, the number of
games in which the player is on the winning team.
Denition 2.5 (Score vector S). The score S(i) of player i is the number of games won by i.
The score vector satisGes the following property.
Lemma 2.6. For a Wh(4k + 1),
∑4k
i=0 S(i) = 2k(4k + 1). For a Wh(4k),
∑4k−1
i=0 S(i) = 2k(4k − 1).
Proof. In each game, there are two winning players. The total number of games is the number of rounds times the number
of games per round. The number of rounds is 4k + 1 for the Wh(4k + 1) and 4k − 1 for the Wh(4k). The number of
games per round is k.
It follows that a Wh(n) has 2n(n−1)=4 possible outcomes. In light of this huge number of outcomes, we restrict our
attention to several special outcomes that are easy to determine. Let P = {0; 1; : : : ; n− 1} be the players in a Wh(n) and
let  be a permutation of P. Imagine that the players have been totally ordered with (0) the best, (1) second best, and
so on, down to (n − 1), who is the worst. From now on, unless otherwise indicated, we assume that  is the identity
permutation, i.e. player 0 is the best, player 1 the second best, etc.
Denition 2.7 (Best-wins outcome). In each game, the team with the best player wins.
As an example of a competition for which the best-wins outcome is plausible, consider a quiz contest in which only the
Grst correct answer presented by any of the four players determines the winner. The best-wins outcome for the Z-cyclic
Wh(13) is shown below. The winning team is bold faced. The ‘v’ between teams has been omitted. Note that the outcome
may be speciGed as follows. Any game involving player 0 is a win for 0 and his partner. Subsequent games at the table
are won on the same side until the next 0 is encountered at which time the winning side may or may not change.
Example 2.8. Wh(13), != 2, players = {0; 1; : : : ; 12}, best-wins outcome
Round Sitout Table 0 Table 1 Table 2
0 1,12 8,5 2,11 3,10 4,9 6,7
1 2,0 9,6 3,12 4,11 5,10 7,8
2 3,1 10,7 4,0 5,12 6,11 8,9
3 4,2 11,8 5,1 6,0 7,12 9,10
4 5,3 12,9 6,2 7,1 8,0 10,11
5 6,4 0,10 7,3 8,2 9,1 11,12
6 7,5 1,11 8,4 9,3 10,2 12, 0
7 8,6 2,12 9,5 10,4 11,3 0,1
8 9,7 3,0 10,6 11,5 12,4 1,2
9 10,8 4,1 11,7 12,6 0,5 2,3
10 11,9 5,2 12,8 0,7 1,6 3,4
11 12,10 6,3 0,9 1,8 2,7 4,5
12 0,11 7,4 1,10 2,9 3,8 5,6
Example 2.9. The score vector for the Wh(13) best-wins outcome is
Player a: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Score S(a): 12 10 8 7 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 5 6
Wins as best in game: 12 9 6 5 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
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For the best-wins outcome, the score vector decreases for the Grst Gve players and then remains relatively constant for
the remaining players. In fact, of the 39 games, 32 are determined by one of the Grst four players being the best in the
game. The highest numbered best player in a game is player 7.
The score vector measures the quantity of wins, not the quality of wins! Strong wins and weak wins are counted the
same. A strong win (and upset) results, for example, when two weak players defeat two strong players. A weak win
results when two strong players defeat two weak players. The score vector generally contains many ties as in the last
example. In the next section, we consider ranking methods that include win quality, break ties, and satisfy reasonableness
criteria.
We consider two other special outcomes in which the presence of one player in a game determines the outcome of the
game. In the worst-loses outcome, the worst player determines the outcome, a loss for his team. (This type of outcome is
likely in a golf competition that pairs professionals with du@ers and for each game, assigns to each team the total score
for the paired players.) The best-worst outcome alternates back and forth between best-wins and worst-loses. All of these
outcomes are determined by the presence of one of a small subset of the total set of players.
Denition 2.10 (Worst-loses outcome). In each game, the team with the worst player loses.
Example 2.11. The score vector for the Wh(13) worst-loses outcome is
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
6 7 8 8 9 8 7 7 7 5 4 2 0
The best-wins outcome and the worst-loses outcome are closely related for whist tournaments given by the Z-cyclic
prime construction, as shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.12. Let SW and SB denote the score vectors for the worst-loses and best-wins outcomes. For any Wh(4k+1)
given by the Z-cyclic prime construction 2.2, and for any player y, SW(y) = 4k − SB(4k − y).
Proof. Consider for j = 1; 2; : : : 2k these two games played at table i:
!i + j − 1;−!i + j − 1 v !k+i + j − 1;−!k+i + j − 1 (mod 4k + 1)
!i − j;−!i − j v !k+i − j;−!k+i − j (mod 4k + 1):
In the table representation of Example 2.8 these games are mirror images across the horizontal line that passes through
round 2k. Note that for a player x in the Grst game, the player on the same side of the table but opposite position is
4k − x in the second game. Furthermore, if x is best in the Grst game, 4k − x is worst in the second game. Thus, the
winning sides of the two games are reversed in the two outcomes. Therefore a win for player y in the worst-loses outcome
corresponds to a loss for player 4k − y in the best-wins outcome. Thus, SW(y) = 4k − SB(4k − y)
The next outcome uses a combination of the best-wins and worst-loses outcomes.
Denition 2.13 (Best–worst outcome). The best player wins every game played. Then the worst player loses all remaining
games not determined by the presence of the best player. Then the second best player wins all remaining games. Then
the second worst player loses all remaining games. This process continues until the outcome of all games is determined.
Example 2.14. The score vector for the Wh(13) best–worst outcome is
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
12 9 6 7 4 5 6 6 7 6 5 4 1
Denition 2.15 (Left-side-wins outcome). At each table, the left side wins every game.
For the Z-cyclic Wh(4k + 1), the left-side-wins outcome results in all players tied. In these tournaments, each player
appears at each table 2k times on the left side and 2k times on the right side. More generally, a tie would result if
at each table we chose one side (left or right) to win every game. For example, this could be left at Table 0, right at
Table 1, left at Table 2, etc.
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In actual tournaments, both players are usually necessary for a win. Assume that the players have been pre-ranked,
and all ranks are distinct. We need to compute the strength of a team from the strength (rank) of the team members. A
natural simplifying assumption is that strength is additive, i.e. the strength of a team is the sum of the strengths of the
team members.
Denition 2.16 (High-sum-wins outcome). The winner of the game a; b v c; d is the team with the highest sum of player
ranks. If the sums are equal, then the side with the highest ranked player wins.
For whist tournaments given by the Z-cyclic prime construction, the high-sum-wins outcome and the best-wins outcome
are the same with the special ranking and ordering below.
Theorem 2.17. For any Wh(4k + 1) given by the Z-cyclic prime construction 2.2, the high-sum-wins outcome with
ranking (i) = i is the same as the best-wins outcome with ordering (i) = 4k − i.
Proof. Suppose a; b v c; d is a game. Then a+ b− c− d is either 0, 4k + 1, or −4k − 1 (see [15]). Clearly, in each of
these three cases, the outcomes are the same.
Given a Wh(n), deGne the permutation  of players by (i) = n− 1− i. In other words, player n− 1 is the best and
player 0 is the worst. In any whist tournament, there are rankings such that for each game, the team with the best player
has the highest sum. Alternatively, there are rankings such that for each game, the team with the worst player has the
lowest sum.
Theorem 2.18. There is a ranking B of players such that the high-sum-wins outcome for B is the same as the best-wins
outcome for .
Proof. Set B(0) = 0, B(1) = 1. For i ¿ 1, recursively select B(i)¿B(i− 1) + B(i− 2). Then given any four ranks,
any sum that includes the largest is greater than the sum of the other two.
Theorem 2.19. There is a ranking W of players such that the high-sum-wins outcome for W is the same as the
worst-loses outcome for .
Proof. DeGne W(i) = B(n− 1)− B(n− 1− i). Then given any four ranks, any sum that includes the smallest is less
than the sum of the other two.
Example 2.20. When n= 8 we can take B: 0; 1; 2; 4; 7; 12; 20; 33, and W: 0; 13; 21; 26; 29; 31; 32; 33.
3. Simple ranking methods
The simple ranking methods start with the score vector and produce a ranking of players using the scores of the players
in each game. The methods are simple because they can be computed in one step. In the next section we consider iterated
ranking methods. We use the notation a; b→ c; d or c; d← a; b to indicate that the team a and b beat the team c and d.
Our Grst ranking method, method OP, is the natural extension of ranking in round-robin tournaments where a player is
ranked by the sum of the scores of opponents beaten.
Ranking Method 3.1 (OP (opponents and partner)).
OP(a) =
∑
a;b→c;d
[S(c) + S(d)− S(b)]:
Our second ranking method is similar to method OP but also uses the score of the player himself when computing the
rank.
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Ranking Method 3.2 (POP (player, opponents and partner)).
POP(a) =
∑
a;b→c;d
[S(a) + S(c) + S(d)− S(b)]
= OP(a) + S(a)
2:
It is desirable to identify ranking methods that satisfy certain “reasonableness” properties.
Denition 3.3. A ranking method is consistent with the score vector for a whist tournament and outcome if
S(a)¿S(b)⇒ (a)¿(b):
Example 3.4. Method OP is not consistent with the score vector for the Z-cyclic Wh(13) and the best-wins outcome.
Method POP is consistent with the score vector.
Player a: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Score S(a): 12 10 8 7 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 5 6
OP(a): 66 43 27 19 6 14 13 4 3 7 6 5 9
POP(a): 210 143 91 68 31 39 38 20 12 23 22 30 45
Player 4 has a higher score but lower OP rank than player 9. Also, player 12 has a higher score but lower OP rank
than players 5 and 6.
For a given ranking method, it is not surprising to Gnd whist tournaments and outcomes not consistent with the score
vector. The score vector measures the quantity of wins and the ranking methods measure the quality of wins. A player
with strong wins can and should outrank a player who has a few more wins, but all weak. Thus the fact that method
OP is not always consistent with the score vector is a promising sign that the method might yield a ranking that is in
some sense more reasonable. However, we will see that method OP lacks a desirable monotonicity criterion that we call
stability.
The next two ranking methods take into account wins and losses to calculate the rank of a player. Let L(a) denote the
number of losses of player a. Note that since no tied outcomes are allowed, for a Wh(n), S(a) + L(a) = n− 1.
Ranking Method 3.5 (OPLLOP (OP less losses OP)).
OPLLOP(a) =
∑
a;b→c;d
[S(c) + S(d)− S(b)]−
∑
a;b←c;d
[L(c) + L(d)− L(b)]:
Ranking Method 3.6 (POPLLPOP (POP less losses POP)).
POPLLPOP(a) =
∑
a;b→c;d
[S(a) + S(c) + S(d)− S(b)]−
∑
a;b←c;d
[L(a) + L(c) + L(d)− L(b)]:
The following theorem establishes relationships among these methods.
Theorem 3.7. Given a Wh(n),
(i) OPLLOP(a) = (n− 2)S(a)− n2=2 + 3n=2− 1,
(ii) POPLLPOP(a) = (3n− 4)S(a)− 3n2=2 + 7n=2− 2,
(iii)
∑
a OPLLOP(a) = 0,
(iv)
∑
a POPLLPOP(a) = 0.
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Proof. (i)
OPLLOP(a) =
∑
a;b→c;d
[S(c) + S(d)− S(b)]−
∑
a;b←c;d
[n− 1− S(c)− S(d) + S(b)]
=
∑
a;b v c;d
[S(c) + S(d)− S(b)]− (n− 1)(n− 1− S(a))
=
[∑
e
S(e)
]
− S(a)− (n− 1)(n− 1− S(a))
= n(n− 1)=2− (n− 1)2 + (n− 2)S(a)
= (n− 2)S(a)− n2=2 + 3n=2− 1:
(ii) Similar to (i),
(iii) and (iv) Immediate.
By Theorem 3.7 these ranking methods produce rankings that are translates of multiples of the score vector, so we do
not consider them further.
The next three reasonableness properties are based on changing the outcome of a single game while leaving the outcome
of all the other games unchanged.
Denition 3.8. A ranking method is stable for a whist tournament and outcome if whenever a; x ← b; y, then in the new
outcome which di@ers from the original outcome only in that a; x → b; y, we have ′(a) − ′(b)¿ (a) − (b), where
′(a) denotes the rank of a for the new outcome.
Denition 3.9. A ranking method is strongly stable for a whist tournament and outcome if whenever player a is given a
new win, then for any other player b, except for the partner in the changed game, ′(a)− ′(b)¿ (a)− (b).
Denition 3.10. A ranking method is independent for a whist tournament and outcome if whenever (a)¿(b), and the
outcome of a game not involving a and b is switched, then ′(a)¿′(b).
Similar properties are deGned in voting theory. In that setting, stability is known as monotonicity, and independence is
known as independence of irrelevant alternatives (see [19]).
Theorem 3.11. Method POP is stable for all tournaments and outcomes.
Proof. To simplify notation, we write  instead of POP.
Let a and b be two players in a game g: a; x ← b; y. We claim that ′(a)− ′(b)¿(a)− (b).
Let Bij (=0,1, or 2) and Wij (=0 or 1) denote respectively the number of times player i beats player j and the number
of times i wins with j in the original outcome. Then
′(a) = (a) + [S(a) + 1 + S(b)− 1 + S(y)− 1− (S(x) + 1)]
+ S(a) + Bax − Bab − Bay +Wab +Way;
′(b) = (b)− [S(a) + S(x) + S(b)− S(y)]
− (S(b)− 1)− Bby + (1− Bab) + (Bbx − 1)−Wab −Wbx:
The di@erence ′(a)− ′(b) is
((a)− (b)) + 3S(a) + 3S(b)− 3 + A;
where
A= Bax + Bby + 2Wab − Bay +Way − Bbx +Wbx:
Since S(a) + S(b)¿ 2 and the smallest possible value for A is −3, ′(a)− ′(b)¿ (a)− (b).
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To see that ′(a)−′(b) is strictly larger than (a)−(b), consider these games: the other game in which a and y are
opponents and the other game in which b and x are opponents. The smallest value of −3 for A is obtained only if a and b
win these games (or this game). In this case S(a)+S(b)¿ 4 so ′(a)−′(b)¿ (a)−(b)+6. If exactly one of these games
is a loss for a or b then the smallest possible value for A is −2 and S(a)+ S(b)¿ 3, so ′(a)−′(b)¿ (a)−(b)+4.
If a and b both lost these games, then A¿− 1 and S(a) + S(b)¿ 2, so ′(a)− ′(b)¿ (a)− (b) + 2.
Note: Applying the same analysis to method OP, we see that if the outcome of the game a; x ← b; y is changed, then
′(a)− ′(b) = (a)− (b) + S(a) + S(b)− 3 + A:
Although stability fails for some outcomes, we can conclude that the stability condition holds for method OP for any two
players a and b such that S(a) + S(b)¿ 6 or (a)− (b)¿ 4.
Theorem 3.12. For every Wh(n) with n¿ 12 there is an outcome for which strong stability fails for method POP.
Proof. Suppose n¿ 12. Consider an outcome with game a; x ← y; z, not involving b, such that a loses all games, y and
z win only against a and split when they play each other, and x wins all games not speciGed. Then S(a) = 0, S(y)6 3,
S(z)6 3, S(x)¿ n− 4 (x loses once with a and possibly once with each of y and z). If the outcome of the game above
is changed, then
′(a) = (a) + [S(a) + 1 + S(y)− 1 + S(z)− 1− (S(x) + 1)]
+ S(a) + Bax − Baz − Bay +Waz +Way:
′(b) = (b)− Bby − Bbz + Bba + Bbx +Wby +Wbz −Wba −Wbx:
The di@erence ′(a)− ′(b) is
((a)− (b)) + 2S(a) + S(y) + S(z)− S(x)− 2 + A;
where
A= Bax + Bby + Bbz − Baz − Bay − Bba − Bbx
+Waz +Way +Wba +Wbx −Wby −Wbz:
Since Bax =Bay =Baz =Way =Waz =Wba=0 and Bba=2 we have that −66A6 3. Thus 2S(a)+ S(y)+ S(z)− S(x)−
2 + A= 8− n+ A6 11− n¡ 0. Therefore strong stability fails for this outcome.
Stability for method OP is closely related to a structural property of whist tournaments that we call the 3-Game Property.
Denition 3.13. Let a and b be two players in a whist tournament. DeGne Pab = {x : x is a partner of either a or b in
a game in which a and b are opponents}.
Thus, if the games in which a and b are opponents are a; x v b; y and a; v v b; u, then Pab = Pba = {x; y; u; v}. Clearly
the cardinal number |Pab|= 2, 3, or 4.
Denition 3.14. A whist tournament has the 3-Game Property (is a 3-G tournament) i@ for all players a and b, |Pab|=2.
If a Wh(n) has the 3-G Property and a; x v b; y is one game in which a and b are opposed, then the other game is
a; y v b; x. Furthermore, the second game in which a and y are opposed is a; b v x; y. Thus every pair a; b of players
determines a sub-whist tournament with 4 players. Such tournaments exist for all n= 1 or 4 (mod 12) and n¿ 4. Given
a RBIBD (12k+4; 4; 1), there is a corresponding 3-G Wh(12k+4) found by associating to each block of the RBIBD the
Wh(4) on its points. These designs exist for all k¿ 0. Similarly, given a NRBIBD(12k+1; 4; 1), there is a corresponding
Wh(12k + 1). For more details, see Anderson [1].
Theorem 3.15. If a Wh(n) has the 3-Game Property then method OP is stable for every outcome.
Proof. Suppose that a Wh(n) is a 3-G tournament. Assume an outcome has been speciGed such that a; x ← b; y. We
need to show that in the new outcome which is the same as the old except that the outcome of this game is switched
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to a; x → b; y, we have D= [′(a)− ′(b)]− [(a)− (b)]¿ 0. The only other games that involve two or more players
from {a; b; x; y} are: a; y v b; x and a; b v x; y.
We can write (a) = 1(a) + 2(a) + 3(a), where 1(a) is the contribution to (a) from the game to be changed,
2(a) is the contribution from the other two games above, and 3(a) is the contribution from all other games; similarly
for (b). Note that S′(a) = S(a) + 1, S′(x) = S(x) + 1, S′(b) = S(b) − 1, S′(y) = S(y) − 1, and that ′3(a) = 3(a) and
′3(b) = 3(b). Thus D= E + F , where E = [
′
1(a)− 1(a)]− [′1(b)− 1(b)] and F = [′2(a)− 2(a)]− [′2(b)− 2(b)].
Since E = [S′(b) + S′(y) − S′(x)] − [S(y) − S(a) − S(x)] = S(a) + S(b) − 3, we have D = S(a) + S(b) − 3 + F . We
consider cases.
Case 1: a; y ← b; x and a; b← x; y
D = S(a) + S(b)− 3− (−1) = S(a) + S(b)− 2¿ 0.
Case 2: a; y ← b; x and a; b→ x; y
D = S(a) + S(b)− 3 + 1− (−1− 1) = S(a) + S(b)¿ 4.
Case 3: a; y → b; x and a; b← x; y
D = S(a) + S(b)− 3 + 1 = S(a) + S(b)− 2¿ 0.
Case 4: a; y → b; x and a; b→ x; y
D = S(a) + S(b)− 3 + 1 + 1 = S(a) + S(b)− 1¿ 3.
Lemma 3.16. Let Wh(n) be a tournament that does not have the 3-Game Property. If there is no pair a; b of players
such that |Pab|= 4, then the tournament has a sub-whist tournament with 5 players.
Proof. Let Wh(n) be a tournament that does not have the 3-Game Property, and assume that no pair a; b of players
satisGes the condition |Pab| = 4. Then for some pair a; b of players, |Pab| = 3. We may assume that the two games in
which a and b are opponents are: game 1: a; x v b; y and game 2: a; y v b; z, with the players a; b; x; y; z all distinct.
Consider the other game, game 3, in which x and y are opponents. By assumption |Pxy|= 2 or 3. So in game 3, either
x and b partner or y and a partner. But y and a have already partnered in game 2, so x and b must partner in game 3.
Now y and b oppose in games 2 and 3. There are already 5 distinct players in these two games. Thus Pyb = {a; x; z}
and game 3 must be b; x v y; z. The two remaining games of the sub-whist tournament on the players {a; b; x; y; z} are
similarly determined to be a; z v x; y and a; b v z; x.
Theorem 3.17. For all n¿ 16, if a Wh(n) does not have the 3-Game Property, then there is an outcome for which
stability fails for method OP.
Proof. To simplify notation, we write  instead of OP.
We consider two cases.
Case 1: There is no pair i; j of players such that |Pij|= 4. By Lemma 3.16 there is a sub-Wh(5). Suppose the players
involved are {a; b; x; y; z}. Assign game outcomes: a; x ← b; y; a; y ← b; z; a; b ← x; z; a; z ← x; y; b; x ← y; z; and
a; b; x; z lose all other games. The last requirement is possible since no pair of these players are in any other game together.
Compute the ranks: (a) = 0, (b) = 2S(a) + S(x)− S(z) =−1. Now change the outcome of the Grst game above. The
new ranks are: ′(a) = S′(b) + S′(y)− S′(x) = S′(y)− 2, ′(b) = S′(a) + S′(y)− S′(z) = S′(y)− 2. Hence, stability fails
for this outcome.
Case 2: There is a pair a; b of players with |Pab|= 4. Suppose the games in which a and b oppose are:
game 1: a; x ← b; y
game 2: a; u→ b; v
with all players distinct.
Consider any outcome such that
(i) S(a) = S(b) = 1, with player b on the winning side in game 1 and player a on the winning side in game 2.
(ii) y loses with a as partner, but wins all other games. Then S(y) = n− 2.
(iii) Besides game 1, x loses only with b and the other game x opposes y. Then S(x) = n− 4 (or n− 3, if x loses with
b to y).
(iv) S(u) = S(v) + 1 (or S(u) = S(v), if x loses with b to y).
To ensure that condition (iv) can be met, note that player u has so far been assigned at most 6 wins (two against a,
two against b, one with x and one with y) and at most 5 losses (one with b, two against x, and two against y). Similarly,
player v has so far been assigned at most 6 losses in partnerships with a and b and in opposition to x and y and at
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most 5 wins in opposition to a and b and in partnerships with x and y. These partial win–loss records may be reduced
somewhat (if for example u partners with x or y in a win against a or b), but each of u and v have at least 4 games for
which the outcome is not determined by conditions (i)–(iii). At least two of these games for each player do not involve
the other player, so condition (iv) is easily met.
For this outcome (assuming b and x are not partners in a game against y)
(a) = S(b) + S(v)− S(u) = 1 + S(v)− (S(v) + 1) = 0;
(b) = S(a) + S(x)− S(y) = 1 + (n− 4)− (n− 2) =−1:
Now consider this outcome with game 1 changed. Then ′(b) = 0 and
′(a) = S′(b) + S′(y)− S′(x) + S′(b) + S′(v)− S′(u)
= 0 + (n− 3)− (n− 3) + 0 + S(v)− S(u) =−1:
If it happens that b and x are partners in a game against y, then for the speciGed outcome (a) = 1 and (b) = 0 and
with the revised outcome ′(a) = 0 + (n− 3)− (n− 2) + 0 + S(v)− S(u) =−1 and ′(b) = 0. Thus method OP is not
stable.
We note that ranking method OP is inconsistent with the score vector for the tournaments and changed outcomes in
the case where |Pab|= 4.
We saw in Theorem 3.15 that method OP is stable for tournaments with the 3-Game property. However, method OP
is not strongly stable except when n= 4.
Theorem 3.18. For all n¿ 4, if a Wh(n) has the 3-Game Property then there is an outcome for which strong stability
fails for method OP.
Proof. Suppose n¿ 4. Let a; x v y; z be any game and b a player not in the game. Using the outcomes and notation
described in the proof of Theorem 3.12, we have S(n) = 0, S(y) = S(z) = 2, and S(x) = n− 2. Applying method OP we
have
′(a)− ′(b) = (a)− (b) + S(y) + S(z)− S(x)− 3 + A
= (a)− (b) + 3− n+ A:
Since Bby = 2= Bbz = Bba, Bbx = 0=Wby =Wbz and Wbx = 1, A= 3. Because the tournament has the 3-Game property, n
must be larger than 6; thus strong stability fails.
Theorem 3.19. If there exist players a and b such that |Pab| = 4 and n¿ 12, then there is an outcome for which
independence fails for methods OP and POP.
Proof. Suppose n¿ 12 and there are two games a; w v b; x and a; y v b; z such that w; x; y; z are distinct. Consider an
outcome such that
(i) b loses every game.
(ii) a wins the two games above and loses all other games.
(iii) x wins all games not speciGed by (i) and (ii).
(iv) z wins all games not speciGed by (i)–(iii).
(v) y loses all games not speciGed by (i)–(iv).
(vi) w loses all games not speciGed by (i)–(v).
Then S(b) = 0, S(a) = 2, S(x) = n − 3, S(z)¿ n − 5, S(y)6 6, and S(w)6 8. Thus OP(b) = 0 and OP(a) = S(x) +
S(z)− S(w)− S(y)¿ 2n− 22. Thus OP(a)¿OP(b).
Now consider the outcome that di@ers from the given outcome exactly in those games that do not involve either a or
b. In this outcome
(i) b loses every game, so S′(b) = 0.
(ii) a wins only the two original games, so S′(a) = 2.
(iii) x wins only one game against a and both games against b, so S′(x)6 3.
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(iv) z wins only against a, twice against b, and possibly twice against x. Thus S′(z)6 5.
(v) y loses only with b, with x (unless x and y oppose a or b as partners), and with z (unless y and z oppose a; b, or
x as partners). Thus S′(y)¿ n− 4.
(vi) w loses at most 5 games: with b, with x, with z, and twice against y. Thus S′(a)¿ n− 6.
Also OP; (b)=0 and ′OP(a)=S
′(x)+S′(z)−S′(w)−S′(y)6 18−2n. Since n¿ 12, ′OP(a)¡′OP(b). Thus independence
fails for method OP.
Finally, POP(b)=′POP(b)=0, POP(a)=2S(a)+OP(a)=4+OP(a)¿ 2n−18 and ′POP(a)=2S′(a)+′OP(a)6 22−2n.
Since n¿ 12, ′POP(a)¿POP(b) and 
′
POP(a)¡
′
POP(b), so independence fails for method POP.
Theorem 3.20. If a Wh(n) has the 3-Game Property and n¿ 4, then there is an outcome for which independence fails
for methods OP and POP.
Proof. Let a and b be two players and let a; b v x; y be a game. Then there are games a; x v b; y and a; y v b; x. Let c
be any other player. Then there are games a; c v d; e and a; d v c; e and a; e v c; d. Consider any outcome such that
a; b← x; y a; c→ d; e
a; x → b; y a; d← c; e
a; y → b; x a; e← d; c
and b loses all games, and a; c; d; e lose all other games. Then each of c; d, and e defeat b twice, so S(b) = 0, S(c) = 5,
S(a) = S(d) = S(e) = 3. Thus OP(a) = 2S(b) + S(d) + S(e)− S(c) = 1¿ 0 = OP(b).
The games that involve at least two players from {a; b; c; d; e; x; y} involve at least 16 players. Now consider the
outcome that di@ers only in that player c wins all other games not involving a; b; d; or e. Since n¿ 6, S′(c)¿ 14. Thus
′OP; (a)6− 8 and ′OP(b)¿ 0.
To see that method POP fails independence for a Wh(n) with the 3G property, consider the same outcome as above.
Then POP(a) = 3S(a) + 2S(b) + S(d) + S(e)− S(c) = 10¿ 0 = POP(b) and ′POP(a) = 3S′(a) + 2S′(b) + S′(d) + S′(e)−
S′(c)6− 2¡ 0 = ′POP(b).
Theorem 3.21. For all n¿ 5, if a Wh(n) contains a sub-Wh(5) then there is an outcome for which independence fails.
Proof. Assume that the sub-Wh(5) involves the players a; b; w; x; y. Consider any outcome such that a; w → b; x; a; x →
b; y; a; b ← w; y; a; y ← w; x; b; w ← x; y and b loses all games, a wins only the two games above, x wins all other
games, y wins all other games, and w loses all other games. Then S(a)=2, S(b)=0, S(x)=n−2, S(y)=n−3, S(w)=3
and OP(a) = 2S(b) + S(y)− S(w) = n− 6¿ 0 = OP(b).
Now consider the outcome such that a and b are the same as above, and x loses all other games, y loses all other
games, and w wins all other games. Then S′(a)= 2, S′(b)= 0, S′(x)= 3, S′(y)= 2, S′(w)= n− 2 and ′OP(a)= 2S′(b)+
S′(y)− S′(w) = 4− n¡ 0 = ′OP(b).
To see that POP fails independence for the same outcome, note that POP(a) = n− 2¿ 0 = POP(b) and ′POP(a) = 8−
n¡ 0 = ′POP(b). Trivially, since n¿ 5 and there is a sub-Wh(5), n¿ 8.
We now consider the problem of “upsets” and “violations” based on a given ranking. These two words have been
used synonymously in the literature on round-robin tournaments. In contrast to the situation in round-robin tournaments,
where a ranking directly determines the presumed winner of a game, we must Grst establish a criterion for judging that
a given team “should” defeat another, based on the rankings of the four players involved. We make the assumption that
the strength of a team is the sum of the strengths of its members. We then face the problem that even when a ranking
assigns all players distinct strengths (no ties) we may not be able to determine the presumptive winner of a game because
the strengths of the two teams are equal. Ideally, a ranking based on a given outcome should have few upsets and few
indeterminate situations.
Denition 3.22. A game a; b → c; d is an upset for  if (a) + (b)¡(c) + (d). A game is an indeterminate if the
sums are equal. A game is a violation if it is either an upset or an indeterminate.
It is not di;cult to construct examples of outcomes for which two di@erent rankings, even rankings in which the players
are not ranked in the same order, produce the minimum number of violations. In particular, this can be done when the
minimum number of violations is zero.
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Typically, the score vector when used as a ranking produces a modest fraction of the total number of games as upsets
and a sometimes smaller but often signiGcantly larger fraction of the games as indeterminates. As compared with the score
vector, the rankings produced by methods POP and OP typically (in the experience of the authors) have more upsets,
many fewer or no indeterminates, and fewer total violations. There are examples of outcomes for which the POP and
OP rankings have more violations then the score and where the POP ranking has more upsets or violations that the OP
ranking and vice versa [4].
Iterations of the POP and OP methods, to be discussed in the next section, appear to greatly reduce the number of
violations by essentially eliminating indeterminates, but these methods may still produce more upsets than the score vector.
This rather murky situation may be illuminated by further study.
4. Iterative ranking methods
In this section we consider ranking methods that are obtained by iterating the simple ranking methods of the last section.
These are natural extensions of the iterated Kendall–Wei ranking method from round-robin tournaments [8].
Ranking Method 4.1 (IPOP (iterated POP)).
0(a) = initial value for rank of player a;
i+1(a) =
∑
a;b→c;d
[i(a) + i(c) + i(d) + T − i(b)]; i¿ 0;
T =
∑
x
i(x); sum over all players x:
The IOP (iterated OP) method is deGned the same as above but without the term i(a) in the sum. The term T is
necessary to force convergence as we will soon see.
For most outcomes, as the iteration number i increases the ranks increase very rapidly in absolute value. This makes it
di;cult to compare player ranks for di@erent iterations. For a given iteration, we could normalize the ranks to be between
0 and 1 by dividing by the sum of the ranks. Here we are assuming that the initial ranks are nonnegative and that at
least one is positive. We prefer to, equivalently, normalize the ranks after every iteration.
Ranking Method 4.2 (NIPOP (normalized, iterated POP)).
S0(a) = initial value for strength of player a;
i(a) = Si(a)
/∑
x
Si(x); i¿ 0;
Si+1(a) =
∑
a;b→c;d
[i(a) + i(c) + i(d) + 1− i(b)]; i¿ 0:
The NIOP (normalized, iterated OP) method is deGned the same as above but without the term i(a) in the sum.
Example 4.3. The NIPOP and NIOP rankings for the Wh(13) best-wins outcome are
Player a: 0 1 2 3 4 5
Score S(a): 12 10 8 7 5 5
NIPOP, j(a), j¿ 6: 0.169783 0.135521 0.104317 0.089279 0.060938 0.062342
NIOP, j(a), j¿ 6: 0.159151 0.130612 0.103262 0.089552 0.062743 0.064066
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
5 4 3 4 4 5 6
0.062179 0.048016 0.035564 0.048552 0.048366 0.060768 0.074375
0.063907 0.050065 0.037537 0.050549 0.050396 0.062569 0.075592
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Note that in this example, for each ranking, all ties have been broken, the ranking is consistent with the score vector,
and the ranking converges to the limit (correct to 6 decimal places) after 6 iterations. This example was computed using
the score vector as initial strength, i.e. S0(a) = S(a). However, the IPOP (and IOP) method will always converge to the
same limit for any given initial strengths (including negative values) provided that for every i¿ 0,
∑
x Si(x) 	= 0. The
number of iterations necessary for convergence depends on the initial strengths.
The iterated player rankings i(a) determined by the IPOP method form the state vectors of a linear, homogeneous,
discrete-time dynamical system with constant coe;cients. The transformation matrix M can be expressed as the sum of
four other matrices that isolate the e@ect of each of the player, opponents, partner, and adding T , in the deGnition of the
IPOP method. The same is true for the IOP method except the matrix P is absent.
Lemma 4.4. For a Wh(n), i+1 =Mi, where M is the n by n matrix de=ned by M = P + U + B−W , where
Pjk = S(j); if j = k
= 0; if j 	= k;
Ujk = S(j);
Bjk = the number of times j beats k
= 0; 1; or 2;
Wjk = the number of times j wins with k
= 0 or 1:
The matrix P represents the player’s contribution to M , which comes from i(a) in the de=nition of the IPOP method.
U represents the e?ect of adding T . B is the beats matrix, from i(c) and i(d). W is the wins with matrix, from i(b).
Proof. This representation is immediate if we write i+1(a) as a linear combination of i(0), i(1); : : : ; i(n− 1).
We will next see that the IPOP and IOP methods always converge. This is an application of the Perron–Frobenius
theorem (see [10,14,17]).
Theorem 4.5 (Perron–Frobenius). Let A be a real square matrix with all entries nonnegative. Suppose that some power
of A has all entries positive. Then there exists an eigenvalue .0 ¿ 0 with corresponding eigenvector x0, such that if
. 	= .0 is any other eigenvalue of A, then |.|¡.0. Furthermore, .0 has geometric and algebraic multiplicity 1.
The eigenvalue, .0 is a positive dominant eigenvalue. It follows that x0 = limk→∞(A=.0)ke, where e is the vector of all
ones.
The matrix M of the IPOP and IOP methods is nonnegative. However, if a player wins no games the corresponding
row of M is all zeros, so any power of M has all zeros in the same row. We can essentially “peel o@” such a player
and use the Perron–Frobenius theorem on the matrix corresponding to the remaining players. The conclusion is that the
IPOP and IOP methods converge.
Theorem 4.6. The IPOP and IOP methods converge.
Proof. We will prove convergence for the IOP method where M =U +B−W . Including the matrix P in the sum in the
IPOP method makes the matrix even more positive. Note that Mij = S(i) + Bij −Wij .
The only Wh(4) has the three games: 0,1 v 2,3; 0,2 v 1,3; and 0,3 v 1,2. For this Wh(4) there are only two di@erent
score vectors (up to permutation of players): 3,1,1,1 and 2,2,2,0. These outcomes have the limits 1,0,0,0 and 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0
respectively.
Now consider a Wh(n) with n¿ 4. Suppose Grst that S(i)¿ 0 for all players i. We claim M 2 ¿ 0. If S(i)¿ 1 for all
players i, then every entry of M is greater than 0 so we are done. Suppose then that S(i) = 1 for some player i. Then
there is a single player j such that Wij = 1 and thus Bij = 0 and Mij = 0. For all k 	= i or j, Wik = 0, Bik = 0 or 1, so
Mik ¿ 0. This means that row i of M has exactly two elements equal 0 (Mij and Mii) and all other elements positive. If
(M 2)ik = 0, then column k of M must have every element 0, except possibly the elements in rows j and i. This would
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mean that all scores, except possibly two, equal 1. By Lemma 2.6 this is impossible when n¿ 5. The only Wh(5) is
given by the Z-cyclic prime construction. For this Wh(5) there are four di@erent score vectors (up to permutation of
players): 4,2,2,1,1; 3,3,2,2,0; 3,3,2,1,1 and 2,2,2,2,2. None of these score vectors have all but two scores equal 1. Thus,
the methods converge for outcomes with all scores positive.
Next suppose that S(a) = 0 for some player a. Then every player b 	= a has S(b)¿ 2 since b must beat a in both
games in which they oppose. Without loss of generality, assume a= n− 1. Then every element of row n− 1 of M is 0.
It follows that 0 = 1(n− 1) = 2(n− 1) = · · ·. DeGne the matrix M ′ to be the n− 1 by n− 1 matrix obtained from M
by deleting the last row and column. DeGne the vector ′i to be the vector obtained from i by deleting the last element.
Clearly, ′i+1 =M
′′i . We have M
′2 ¿ 0 by the same argument above. Thus the IPOP and IOP methods converge.
Convergence of the IPOP and IOP ranking methods depends on the inclusion of the term T in DeGnition 4.1.
Example 4.7. Suppose we modify the IOP method as follows:
0(a) = initial value for rank of player a;
i+1(a) =
∑
a;b→c;d
[i(c) + i(d)− i(b)]; i¿ 0:
The method does not converge for the Wh(5) and outcome 3,3,2,1,1. DeGne 0: 3,3,2,1,1. Then 1: 0.375, 0.375, 0.25,
0, 0; 2: 0, 0, 0, 0.5, 0.5; and k = k−3 when k¿ 3.
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